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Eighth Amendment Differentness 
William W. Berry III* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Be an opener of doors. 
– Ralph Waldo Emerson1 
In March 2013, I had the privilege of participating in a symposium at the 
University of Missouri School of Law that addressed the question of whether 
the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Miller v. Alabama was a 
“bombshell” or a “baby step.”2  As discussed below, Miller held that the 
Eighth Amendment barred the use of mandatory juvenile life-without-parole 
(LWOP) sentences.3 
As the fifth case in a decade to expand the scope of the Eighth Amend-
ment4 and the second to broaden its application to juvenile LWOP,5 Miller 
certainly may be no more than another incremental step within a broader   
line of cases.6  On the other hand, Miller suggests a number of possible    
avenues for broadening the Eighth Amendment.  And the need to expand    
the Eighth Amendment has not diminished with the Court’s work over the 
  
 * Assistant Professor and Beccaria Scholar of Criminal Law, University of 
Mississippi. D.Phil., University of Oxford (UK); J.D., Vanderbilt University Law 
School; B.A., University of Virginia.  I would like to thank the MISSOURI LAW 
REVIEW for their invitation to write this Article for their symposium on juveniles and 
life without parole, and their helpful suggestions during the editing process.  I also 
thank Paul Litton for his helpful comments on the initial draft of the Article, and Kait-
lyn Tucker for her excellent research assistance. 
 1. http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/635803-be-an-opener-of-doors. 
 2. See Program, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI SCHOOL OF LAW, http://law. 
missouri.edu/faculty/symposium/lawreview2013/index.html (last updated Feb. 18, 
2013) (describing symposium). 
 3. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
 4. See id. at 2569 (banning mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences); Graham v. 
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (banning LWOP sentences for juvenile offend-
ers in non-homicide crimes); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008) (ban-
ning the death penalty for non-homicide crimes); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
578 (2005) (banning the death penalty for juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (banning the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders). 
 5. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.  For more on the 
practical implications and consequences of Graham, see Cara H. Drinan, Graham on 
the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012). 
 6. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2472. 
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past decade.7  In an age of penal populism, the United States remains an out-
lier, arguably in the history of the world, in its use of mass incarceration of 
criminal offenders.8 
Contrary to Professor Frank Bowman’s claim, the Court’s recent Eighth 
Amendment cases are not a judicial revolution seeking to curb the power of 
legislatures.9  Rather, the Supreme Court’s expansion of the Eighth Amend-
ment, as Judge Nancy Gertner suggests, simply restores an absent Court to its 
proper role of policing legislative overreaching.10  Prior to its 2002 decision 
in Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court largely abdicated its role of protect-
ing the rights of individuals against the majoritarian legislative enactments 
that have resulted in the United States’ position as an outlier in the world in 
its use of severe punishments.11  The failure to abolish capital punishment,12 
the proliferation of mandatory minimum sentences,13 the expansive use of 
LWOP sentences,14 and the mass incarceration of criminal offenders15 render 
  
 7. See, e.g., William W. Berry III, More Different than Life, Less Different than 
Death, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109 (2010) [hereinafter More Different than Life] (arguing 
that LWOP sentences are unique and deserve their own level of higher scrutiny). 
 8. See, e.g., Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List, INTERNATIONAL 
CENTRE FOR PRISON STUDIES 1 (2011), available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/ 
images/news_events/wppl9.pdf (showing that the United States has the highest prison 
population rate in the world at 743 persons per 100,000 of the national population); 
see also MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 9-10 (2d ed. 2006). 
 9. Frank O. Bowman III, Juvenile Lifers and Judicial Overreach: A Curmudg-
eonly Meditation on Miller v. Alabama, 78 MO. L. REV. 1015 (2013) (The recent 
cases are “strands of a web of decisions   in which the [Supreme] Court has consist-
ently used doubtful constitutional inter-pretations to transfer power over criminal 
justice policy from the legislatures . . . to the courts.”). 
 10. Nancy Gertner, Miller v. Alabama: What It Is, What It May Be, and What It 
Is Not, 78 MO. L. REV. 1041 (2013) (symposium keynote remarks). 
 11. See CONNIE DE LA VEGA ET AL., CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING 
PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 11 (May 2012) [hereinafter CRUEL AND UNUSUAL], 
available at www.usfca.edu/law/docs/criminalsentencing/. 
 12. See generally DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH 
PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION 10-13 (2010) (“The American death penalty is 
peculiar insofar as it is the only capital punishment system still in use in the West.”); 
ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE 
PERSPECTIVE 111-28 (4th ed. 2008) (describing the United States’ resistance to abol-
ishing the death penalty); William W. Berry III, The European Prescription for End-
ing the Death Penalty, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1003 (2011) [hereinafter The European 
Prescription] (“The United States of America remains the only Western democracy 
that continues to use capital punishment.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Consequences of Mandato-
ry Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65-114 (2009). 
 14. See CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 11, at 8 (comparing the almost 41,000 
offenders serving LWOP sentences in the United States to the small numbers in other 
countries throughout the world). 
2
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the United States unique among Western nations in its harsh approach to 
criminal sentencing.16 
Given this reality, this Article does not seek to offer a prediction as to 
what Miller will mean, as others in the symposium have done quite well.17  
Instead, the Article explores what Miller can mean.  In doing so, the Article 
highlights different avenues for extending Miller such that it can become a 
bombshell over time, albeit by offering potential baby steps to theorists and 
litigators alike.18 
This contribution, then, illuminates the potential doctrinal and theoreti-
cal consequences of the Miller decision within the broader context of the 
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Without arguing for one 
normative outcome over the other and recognizing that the Court’s work in 
this area has been largely incremental, this Article offers an intellectual road 
map that develops many of the arguments for broadening the Eighth Amend-
ment made more plausible after the Miller decision. 
At the heart of this exploration is the concept that “juveniles are differ-
ent.”19  Specifically, this Article argues that there are two distinct meanings of 
  
 15. Currently, the United States of America has “5 percent of the world’s popu-
lation and 25 percent of the world’s known prison population.” Illegal Drugs: Eco-
nomic Impact, Societal Costs, Policy Responses: Hearings Before the J. Economic 
Comm., 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Sen. Jim Webb, Member, Joint Econ. 
Comm.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg44772/pdf/ 
CHRG-110shrg44772.pdf (providing a transcript of the committee hearing in which 
Senator Webb made his remarks about prison populations). Senator Webb added, 
“Either we have the most evil people in the world, or we are doing something wrong 
with the way that we handle our criminal justice system, and I choose to believe the 
latter.” Id. at 1-2; see also Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Na-
tions’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/us/ 
23prison.html (reporting data about prison and population).   
 16. See CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 11, at 7; Walmsley, supra note 8, at 1. 
 17. See generally AUSTIN SARAT, LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW 
DEATH PENALTY (2012). Frank O. Bowman III, A Curmudgeonly Meditation on Mil-
ler v. Alabama, 78 MO. L. REV. 1015 (2013); Nancy Gertner, Miller v. Alabama: 
What It Is, What It May Be, and What It Is Not, 78 MO. L. REV. 1041 (2013); Michael 
M. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to Adults, 78 MO. L. 
REV. 1087 (2013); Clark Peters, Precedent as a Policy Map: What Miller v. Alabama 
Tells Us About Emerging Adults and the Direction of Contemporary Youth Services, 
78 MO. L. REV. 1183 (2013). 
 18. This Article certainly does not fall into the category that Chief Justice Rob-
erts complained of last summer at the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference. Am. Con-
stitution Soc’y, Law Prof. Ifill Challenges Justice Roberts’ Take on Academic Schol-
arship, ACSBLOG (July 5, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/law-prof-ifill-
challenges-chief-justice-roberts’-take-on-academic-scholarship.  Roberts commented, 
“Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first article is likely to be, you 
know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th Century 
Bulgaria, or something, which . . . isn’t of much help to the bar.”  Id.  
 19. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2482 (2012). 
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this conceptualization: (1) that juveniles are unique as offenders, and (2) that 
juvenile LWOP is a unique punishment.  While certainly not mutually exclu-
sive, each interpretation offers its own set of consequences and paths to pur-
sue in challenging criminal sentences under the Eighth Amendment.  
Part II of the Article provides the context for the Miller case, outlining 
the theoretical underpinnings of the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence.  Part III describes the Court’s “different” jurisprudence, linking the 
concept of “juveniles are different” to the Court’s longstanding view that 
“death is different.”20  In Part IV, the Article demonstrates how the two pos-
sible interpretations of the Court’s statement in Miller that “juveniles are dif-
ferent” – as a character-based form of differentness and, in the case of juve-
nile LWOP, as a punishment-based form of differentness – create distinct 
theoretical bases for broadening the scope of the Eighth Amendment.  Final-
ly, Parts V and VI explore the potential theoretical and doctrinal consequenc-
es of each of those understandings.  
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS 
Before investigating the possible directions for doctrinal expansion of 
the Eighth Amendment, it is important to explore its broader constitutional 
underpinnings.  The force and persuasiveness of each of the potential ap-
proaches outlined below rests, in part, on their respective abilities to capture 
the theoretical constructs of the Eighth Amendment developed by the Su-
preme Court. 
A.  Defining “Cruel and Unusual” 
1.  The Text 
It has long been within the purview of the Court to define what the lan-
guage of the Constitution means, as well as its scope.21  In theory, this allows 
the Court to protect the interests of the minority – those who are subject to 
  
 20. Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Furman v. Georgia is apparently the origin 
of the Court’s “death is different” capital jurisprudence.  Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. 
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regu-
lation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 370 (1995) (crediting Justice 
Brennan as the originator of this line of argument); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is a unique punishment in the 
United States.”); Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of 
the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117 (2004) (discussing the Court's death-is-
different jurisprudence).  
 21. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178-80 (1803) (establishing the 
principle of judicial review and the role of the Court as the primary arbiter of the 
meaning of the Constitution). 
4
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punishment by the State – against overreaching by the legislature in the form 
of cruel and unusual punishments.22 
Cruel punishments are ones that are excessive in light of the offense.23  
This can occur in two senses.  First, a punishment becomes cruel when it 
causes an unwarranted amount of physical pain and suffering.24  A second 
related way that a punishment becomes cruel is when its imposition results in 
a deprivation of life or liberty incongruent with the conduct of the offender.25  
Unusual punishments, by contrast, are those that states rarely impose.26  What 
makes a punishment unusual, then, is its uncommonness or rarity.27  And this 
rarity is the very thing that calls it into question under the Constitution.28 
These basic definitions of cruel and unusual remain largely uncontested.  
There remains ambiguity, however, surrounding which of the multiple possi-
ble meanings of the conjunction “and” apply.29  One possible reading is the 
conjunctive one, in which a punishment must be both cruel and unusual to 
violate the Eighth Amendment.30  Another reading is the disjunctive one, 
where the Amendment would prohibit cruel punishments and unusual pun-
ishments.31  Finally, a third reading would group the two concepts collective-
  
 22. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitu-
tional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1818-19 (1997). 
The exercise of judicial power to invalidate statutes on constitutional grounds has 
been the subject of much academic debate.  See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an 
Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 
112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002); G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional 
Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485, 523-607 (2002).  
 23. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1997); William W. Berry III, Follow-
ing the Yellow Brick Road of the Evolving Standards of Decency: The Ironic Conse-
quences of “Death-Is-Different” Jurisprudence, 28 PACE L. REV. 15, 21 (2007)  
[hereinafter Following the Yellow Brick Road]; Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Der-
showitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 
1784-85 (1970). 
 24. See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 49-50 (2008); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 
U.S. 130, 136 (1879). 
 25. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; Following the Yellow Brick Road, supra note 23, at 
21; Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 23, at 1794.  
 26. Following the Yellow Brick Road, supra note 23, at 19 (citing Goldberg & 
Dershowitz, supra note 23, at 1789). 
 27. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that 
infrequently imposed death penalties “are cruel and unusual in the same way that 
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual”). 
 28. Id. at 310. 
 29. Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit 
Only Punishments That Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567, 605 
(2010). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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ly, such that a “cruel and unusual” punishment is a singular idea.32  This read-
ing combines the ideas because cruel punishments are by their nature unusual, 
and unusual punishments are, by their nature, cruel.33  
As with most constitutional provisions, the Court must next decide what 
its frame of reference for interpretation should be.  Two schools of interpreta-
tion – originalism and living constitutionalism – have dominated this discus-
sion in recent years.34  The next two sections consider the implications of 
these approaches for interpreting the Eighth Amendment. 
2.  The Originalists 
The most obvious originalist approach to the Eighth Amendment, which 
Justice Antonin Scalia has advocated,35 restricts the definition of cruel and 
unusual punishments to those punishments proscribed at the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution.36  Such an approach would mean that capital pun-
ishment in particular creates no Eighth Amendment issue because state gov-
ernments commonly used that punishment in 1787.37  As Justice Scalia and 
others have argued, under this approach only punishments involving infliction 
of torture or some similar brutality would infringe upon the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishments.38 
In recent years, however, Professor John Stinneford and others have 
called this originalist view into question based on historical research.39  Pro-
fessor Stinneford claims that the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment 
  
 32. Id. at 600. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. at 568-69, 584 n.98, 604 n. 225. 
 35. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 957, 965 (1991); John F. Stinneford, The 
Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innova-
tion, 102 NW. L. REV. 1740, 1758-66 (2008) (describing Scalia’s originalist approach 
in detail). 
 36. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 352-53 (2002) (Scalia, J.,      
dissenting). 
 37. See Michael H. Reggio, History of the Death Penalty, in SOCIETY’S FINAL 
SOLUTION: A HISTORY AND DISCUSSION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 1, 4 (Laura E. Randa 
ed., 1997), reprinted in Frontline, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/execution/readings/history.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).  During America’s 
foundational years, hanging served as the most common method of capital punish-
ment.  Id.  Executions were public, and sometimes thousands of onlookers would 
attend a hanging.  Id. at 5.  On occasion, crowds would get drunk and grow violent 
during executions and continue their debauchery well into the night.  Id. 
 38. See, e.g., Stinneford, supra note 35; Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 865 
(1969).  The punishments imposed by Judge Jeffreys during the Bloody Assizes 
would be examples of this, including such atrocities as drawing and quartering.  Id. at 
853-54. 
 39. Stinneford, supra note 35.  
6
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contemplated adjustment over time as a one-way expanding ratchet that 
would prohibit certain punishments based on increased societal understanding 
that a particular punishment is cruel and unusual.40  Further, Professor 
Stinneford has suggested that implicit in this understanding is the concept of 
proportionality.41  In other words, a punishment that, under modern standards, 
is excessive with respect to the culpability of the offender and the harm 
caused by the criminal act violates the Eighth Amendment.42 
Ironically, under either approach to the original meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment, LWOP sentences may be unconstitutional.  Under the approach 
adopted by Justice Scalia, such sentences did not exist in 1787, or at the very 
least did not enjoy widespread usage.43  In that case, the Eighth Amendment’s 
application to LWOP sentences would rest upon whether such sentences are 
more severe than the punishments permitted in 1787; namely, the death pen-
alty.  Many have argued that an LWOP sentence is worse than a capital sen-
tence,44 and the high number of death row volunteers – inmates who waive 
their appeals in order to accelerate their execution dates – seems to support 
this conclusion.45 
  
 40. Id. at 1818-19. 
 41. John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 951-52 (2011) [hereinafter Stinneford, Re-
thinking Proportionality]. 
 42. Id. at 952.  But see William W. Berry III, Separating Retribution from Pro-
portionality: A Response to Stinneford, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 61, 62-69 (2011) 
[hereinafter Separating Retribution from Proportionality] (taking issue with 
Stinneford’s claim that the original conception of Eighth Amendment proportionality 
consists only of retribution as a purpose of punishment). 
 43. See Stinneford, Rethinking Proportinality, supra note 41, at 1757-66 (dis-
cussing how Justice Scalia’s originalist interpretation of “unusual” from the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause is based on what was legal and practiced at the end of the 
eighteenth century rather than what was disproportionate or excessive). 
 44. This certainly is true with respect to likelihood of reversal on appeal. See, 
e.g., Alex Kozinski & Steven Bright, Debate, The Modern View of Capital Punish-
ment, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1353, 1360-61 (1997) (quoting Judge Alex Kozinski’s 
view that innocent defendants are better off being charged with a capital crime in 
California because they will get “a whole panoply of rights of appeal and review that 
you don't get in other cases”); Patrick McIlheran, Illinois Re-Examines Life Sentences, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 25, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 19566654 (“[T]he 
safeguards that states build into capital cases – the things that make the death penalty 
so costly – make it less likely an innocent man will be executed than simply impris-
oned wrongly.”). 
 45. See, e.g., John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and 
Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939, 939-40, 940 n.5 (2005); Anthony J. Casey, 
Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An Argument for Restricting a Defendant’s Right 
to Volunteer for Execution at Certain Stages in Capital Proceedings, 30 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 75, 76 n.1 (2002); see also G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Compe-
tency, Voluntariness and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 860, 860-61 (1983), available at http://scholarlycommons. 
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Under the Stinneford reading of the original meaning of the cruel and 
unusual punishment clause, LWOP sentences could also violate the Eighth 
Amendment, at least in cases in which that punishment is excessive for the 
crimes committed.  While the Supreme Court has rejected this idea before,46 
it is certainly possible that the societal view of proportionate punishment has 
evolved over time to conclude that LWOP sentences are excessive for certain 
crimes, particularly non-violent, victimless crimes.47 
3.  The Evolving Standards of Decency 
The second common method of constitutional interpretation is that of a 
living Constitution, one whose meaning is not static but evolves over time 
consistent with modern understanding.48  This approach reasons that           
the world is very different from what it was in 1787, and that the point of 
employing broad constitutional language – like “cruel and unusual punish-
ments” – was to allow the political branches to supply it with more specified 
content over time.49 
In Weems v. United States, the Supreme Court adopted such an ap-
proach.50  Explaining that for a constitutional principle “to be vital, [it] must 
be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth,” the 
Court counseled that “[i]n the application of a constitution, therefore, our 
contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.”51  Forty 
years later, the Court cemented this concept in Trop v. Dulles, explaining that 
“the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is 
not static.”52  As a result, the Court mandated that the Eighth Amendment 
“draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society.” 53   
As explored below, the Court has adopted a two-part test to determine 
whether a particular punishment contravenes evolving standards of decency.  
First, the Court examines what it terms objective indicia – the use of the pun-
  
law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol74/iss3/6/; Christy Chandler, Note, Voluntary Execu-
tions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1897, 1902-03 (1998). 
 46. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95 (1991).  But see infra Part 
III (suggesting that Graham and Miller may provide a basis for challenging the hold-
ing in Harmelin). 
 47. Indeed, many of those currently serving LWOP sentences are non-violent 
offenders, often because of drug offenses.  CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 11,       
at 33. 
 48. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (2005). 
 49. Id.  
 50. 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). 
 51. Id.  
 52. 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (footnote omitted) (referencing the Court’s deci-
sion in Weems v. United States). 
 53. Id. at 101.  
8
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ishment by juries and legislatures.54  Specifically, the Court counts the num-
ber of legislatures that allow the punishment in question.55  Second, the Court 
brings its “own judgment . . . to bear,”56 exploring whether the punishment is 
excessive under the “evolving standards of decency.”57  In particular, the 
Court assesses whether the punishment in question satisfies retributive and 
utilitarian purposes of punishment.58 
Interestingly, in such cases the Court has always found that punishments 
violating the evolving standards of decency fail both the objective and subjec-
tive inquiries.59  This consistency may stem, in part, from a concern that using 
the Eighth Amendment to nullify a legislatively-approved punishment re-
quires a more robust analysis than the mere belief of five justices that a par-
ticular punishment is excessive or inappropriate.60 
B.  Two Conceptions of Proportionality 
Perhaps the unifying value behind the Court’s decision to place Eighth 
Amendment procedural and substantive restrictions on the use of particular 
  
 54. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (indicating that the Court 
should look to state legislative practices and jury decisions to help determine the 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) 
(defining the approach as requiring an examination of “objective indicia”).  Presuma-
bly, the less the use, the more unusual the punishment is, and the more cruel it is ei-
ther because it is objectively cruel and thus used less or because imposing unusual 
punishments is cruel. 
 55. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
U.S. 302, 331 (1989)) (“We have pinpointed that the ‘clearest and most reliable ob-
jective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's 
legislatures.’”).  In practice, the Court’s application of this method has created con-
troversy.  See, e.g., id. at 337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The question of how to count 
the states, including whether states that have abolished the death penalty has been one 
concern.  Id. at 342-47.  In addition, in several cases, the number of states allowing 
the practice has been the majority in the United States.  See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 
554.  In such cases, the Court has looked to both the direction of the change and inter-
national practices. See id.; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 56. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.  
 57. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)); Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-61 (quoting Dulles, 356 
U.S. at 101); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101); Coker, 443 
U.S. at 603 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 58. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; see also sources cited supra note 4. These 
purposes in the death penalty context typically include retribution and deterrence, and 
occasionally dangerousness. See sources cited supra note 4.  
 59. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407-08; Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-61; Atkins, 
536 U.S. at 311-12; Coker, 443 U.S. at 592.  
 60. Following the Yellow Brick Road, supra note 23, at 27-28 (discussing Justice 
Blackmun’s dissent in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)). 
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punishments is the concept of proportionality.61  The Court’s cases have de-
veloped this idea in two senses: proportionality between the criminal offense 
and the punishment (herein described as “absolute proportionality”)62 and 
proportionality among punishments for offenders committing similar criminal 
offenses (“relative proportionality”).63 
1.  Relative Proportionality (“Unusual”) 
In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court famously declared the death 
penalty unconstitutional because its application was inconsistent.64  As Justice 
Stewart explained, because there were so many individuals committing mur-
ders and so few receiving the death penalty, receiving a death sentence was 
akin to being “struck by lightning.”65  When the Court reinstated the death 
penalty four years later in Gregg v. Georgia,66 it did so because the Georgia 
legislature had adopted safeguards67 to ensure that it would achieve some 
level of consistency – or at the very least avoid randomness – in determining 
who received the death penalty.68 
In Furman and Gregg, then, the Court established that the Eighth 
Amendment required the use of procedural safeguards (at least in capital cas-
es) that ensured some level of relative proportionality in the implementation 
of punishments.69  In other words, failure to provide for some modicum of 
comparable outcomes for comparable offenders in death penalty cases – some 
measure to minimize the disparity inherent in jury sentencing – violates the 
Eighth Amendment.  
One way to conceptualize the Eighth Amendment problem here is to la-
bel such outlier sentences as “unusual,” in the sense that most other similar 
  
 61. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 437 (highlighting the need for a unifying Eighth 
Amendment principle); William W. Berry III, Promulgating Proportionality, 46 GA. 
L. REV. 69, 102 (2011) [hereinafter Promulgating Proportionality] (arguing that pro-
portionality is the unifying Eighty Amendment principle). 
 62. Promulgating Proportionality, supra note 61, at 90-93. 
 63. Id. at 93-96. 
 64. 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam). 
 65. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 66. 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).  The Court decided two additional cases that up-
held state capital punishment statutes for similar reasons.  See Jurek v. Texas, 428 
U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (upholding Texas’s new capital statute); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 
U.S. 242, 260 (1976) (upholding Florida’s new capital statute). 
 67. These safeguards included: (1) bi-furcation of the guilt and sentencing phases 
at trial, (2) the requirement of proof of aggravating circumstances to impose the death 
penalty, and (3) proportionality review by the state supreme court.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 
190-91, 204-05. 
 68. Id. at 222-23. 
 69. Id. at 164-67; Furman, 408 U.S. at 271-81 (Brennan, J., concurring); Prom-
ulgating Proportionality, supra note 61, at 72. 
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offenders receive lesser sentences.70  Again, the constitutional problem is that 
certain sentences are excessive by comparison to those received by offenders 
committing similar crimes.71    
2.  Absolute Proportionality (“Cruel”) 
Rather than asking whether a punishment is excessive in terms of the 
punishments imposed on comparable offenders, absolute proportionality asks 
if a punishment is excessive in terms of the offense committed.72  In the 
Court’s cases, this inquiry contemplates excessiveness in terms of all of the 
applicable purposes of punishment.73  
Assessing absolute proportionality requires consideration of the charac-
teristics of both the offender and the criminal act.74  As the Court explained in 
Woodson v. North Carolina, the Eighth Amendment requires individualized 
sentencing consideration in capital cases and thus prohibits mandatory death 
sentences.75  Further, the Court has prohibited limitations on the use of miti-
gating evidence at sentencing to allow for complete consideration of each 
individual’s situation.76 
The question, then, is whether the particular punishment at issue is al-
ways excessive in light of the characteristics of the offense or the offender.77  
For instance, the Court has held that the death penalty is an excessive pun-
  
 70. William W. Berry III, Practicing Proportionality, 64 FLA. L. REV. 687, 694 
(2012) [hereinafter Practicing Proportionality]; Promulgating Proportionality, supra 
note 61, at 78. 
 71. Practicing Proportionality, supra note 70, at 694-95; Promulgating Propor-
tionality, supra note 61, at 75-76. 
 72. This inquiry is not limited to “just deserts” retribution; it also includes other 
purposes of punishment. See Separating Retribution from Proportionality, supra note 
42, at 70; Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 
DUKE L.J. 263, 266 (2005).  But see Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality,         
supra note 41, at 967-78 (arguing that “the Supreme Court should recognize that 
excessiveness under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is a retributive con-
cept and should not permit legislatures to pursue utilitarian goals at the expense of 
individual justice”). 
 73. In the death penalty context, the only valid purposes of punishment are retri-
bution and deterrence. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-84 (“The death penalty is said to 
serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by 
prospective offenders.”); William W. Berry III, Ending Death by Dangerousness: A 
Path to the De Facto Abolition of the Death Penalty, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 889, 893, 910, 
920 (2010).  But, in juvenile LWOP cases, rehabilitation is back on the table.  See 
Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231, 1233, 1238-
40 (2013).  
 74. Promulgating Proportionality, supra note 61, at 90-93. 
 75. 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976). 
 76. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978). 
 77. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1977). 
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ishment for any non-homicide crime78 and for mentally retarded79 and juve-
nile offenders.80  If the requirement of relative proportionality is an analog to 
the concept of unusualness, then the concept of absolute proportionality can 
serve as a proxy for the concept of cruelty.81  A punishment that is excessive 
with respect to the crime committed – and the applicable purposes of punish-
ment – is, by definition, a cruel one.82  
C.  Judicial Hesitancy 
Despite the robust development of Eighth Amendment doctrine83 since 
the Court’s 1972 decision in Furman, the story of the Court’s regulation of 
state criminal punishment is one of passivity and hesitancy.84  Indeed, as ex-
plored below, the Court has largely embraced the concept of deference to 
state legislatures in its application of the Eighth Amendment.85 
1.  Limited Application of Absolute Proportionality 
Prior to the past decade, the Court had placed virtually no Eighth 
Amendment limit on the imposition of particular punishments, even where 
the punishment seemed excessive for the crime.86  This was particularly true 
in non-capital cases.87  
  
 78. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447 (2008). 
 79. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 80. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
 81. See Practicing Proportionality, supra note 70, at 687; see also Promulgating 
Proportionality, supra note 61, at 114 (proposing a new model of proportionality 
providing a unifying principle of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).  
 82. Promulgating Proportionality, supra note 61, at 106. 
 83. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court 
and Capital Punishment, 1963-2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2007); Mary Sigler, 
Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the Supreme Court’s Capital 
Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151 (2003); Steiker & Steiker, 
supra note 20 (summarizing and commenting on developments since Furman). 
 84. There is a second narrative, one that separates capital from non-capital cases. 
See supra Part II.A.  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The 
Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2009) (acknowledging the Court’s different treatment of 
capital cases); Douglas A. Berman, A Capital Waste of Time? Examining the Supreme 
Court’s “Culture of Death,” 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 861 (2008). 
 85. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 411 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting); William W. Berry III, Repudiating Death, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
441, 451, 459 (2011) [hereinafter Repudiating Death]. 
 86. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66, 77 (2003) (affirming on ha-
beas review two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life for stealing ap-
proximately $150 of videotapes, where defendant had three prior felony convictions); 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18, 30-31 (2003) (affirming sentence of twenty-five 
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Indeed, the Supreme Court upheld the following harsh and arguably  
disproportionate sentences under the Eighth Amendment: two consecutive 
sentences of twenty-five years to life for stealing $150 worth of videotapes;88 
a twenty-five year sentence for stealing $1,200 worth of golf clubs under       
a three strikes law;89 an LWOP sentence for a first offense of possessing    
672 grams of cocaine;90 two consecutive sentences of twenty years for pos-
session with intent to distribute and distribution of nine ounces of marijua-
na;91 and a third strike life-with-parole sentence for felony theft of $120.75 by 
false pretenses.92  
In fact, prior to 2002, the Court only limited the state’s ability to punish 
under the Eighth Amendment in four cases in the post-Furman era.93  In the 
death penalty context, the Court prohibited the use of capital punishment for 
rapists,94 insane offenders,95 and offenders playing a minor role in felony 
murder crimes.96  The Court also held in Solem v. Helm that an LWOP sen-
tence for presenting a bad check for $100 violated the Eighth Amendment.97  
Solem, though, is an outlier in light of the Court’s decisions cited above – 
similar cases of disproportional sentences in non-capital cases.  Indeed, the 
standard that the Court articulated in those cases is one of gross dispropor-
tionality, which is a standard almost never met. 
  
years to life for stealing approximately $1,200 of golf clubs, where defendant had four 
prior felony convictions); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 959-60 (1991) (af-
firming sentence of life without parole for first offense of possessing 672 grams of 
cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370-72 (1982) (per curiam) (affirming two 
consecutive sentences of twenty years for possession with intent to distribute and 
distribution of nine ounces of marijuana); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265-66 
(1980) (affirming life with parole sentence for felony theft of $120.75 by false pre-
tenses where defendant had two prior convictions).  But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 
277, 281-84 (1983) (affirming the Eighth Circuit’s reversal of a sentence of life with-
out parole for presenting a no account check for $100, where defendant had six prior 
felony convictions). 
 87. See sources cited supra note 86. 
 88. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66, 77. 
 89. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18, 30-31. 
 90. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961, 994. 
 91. Hutto, 454 U.S. at 370-72. 
 92. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1980). 
 93. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 
277, 303 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).  
 94. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593. 
 95. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409. 
 96. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788.  But see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 
(1987) (allowing prosecution for reckless endangerment in felony murder cases). 
 97. 463 U.S. at 281-82, 303. 
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2.  The “Categorical Revolution” 
Beginning in 2002, the Court has narrowly decided five cases holding 
that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits a certain type of offender 
or offense from receiving a certain punishment.98  As Professors Jordan and 
Carol Steiker have noted, this shift is remarkable in its departure from the 
Court’s previous refusal to entertain such claims.99 
Part of the explanation for the Court’s decision to move in this direction 
includes the changed death penalty climate in the United States.100  Beginning 
in the late 1990s, a series of events led to increasing doubts about the use of 
the death penalty, particularly considering the risk of the execution of an  
innocent individual.101  In 1991 and 1994 respectively, Supreme Court Justic-
  
 98. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (banning mandatory juve-
nile LWOP sentences); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (banning 
LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders in non-homicide crimes); Kennedy v. Louisi-
ana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (banning the death penalty for non-homicide crimes); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005) (banning the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (banning the death penalty 
for mentally retarded offenders).  
 99. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Entrenchment and/or Destabilization? 
Reflections on (Another) Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Pun-
ishment, 30 LAW AND INEQ. 211, 212-13 (2012). 
 100. For an explanation of the connection between popular opinion and              
the Court’s decisionmaking, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:      
HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED                
THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2011); Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexception-
alism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. REV. 365, 365 (2009) (arguing that the 
majoritarian approach of the evolving standards is consistent with the Court’s majori-
tarian tendencies). 
 101. See Elizabeth R. Jungman, Beyond All Doubt, 91 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1066-67 
(2003) (showing research indicates that approximately “seven out of every ten [peo-
ple] sentenced to death in the twenty-three years [after] Furman v. Georgia were 
convicted in trials . . . found to be flawed,” that many of these were found to be inno-
cent, and that 5% of defendants sentenced to death are exonerated later (footnote 
omitted)).  Indeed, the Innocence Project reports that 311 individuals in the United 
States have been exonerated based on DNA evidence, eighteen of whom spent time 
on death row.  DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www. 
innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2013).  For two contrasting views on the ability of findings of inno-
cence to end capital punishment, compare Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence 
Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573 (2004) (arguing that 
appreciating the fallibility of the criminal justice system of convicting innocent people 
will have a lasting effect on criminal law), with Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, 
The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Inno-
cence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587 
(2005) (questioning the strategic value of focusing on innocence in the effort to re-
form or abolish capital punishment). 
14
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es Lewis Powell and Harry Blackmun renounced the death penalty based      
in part on their perceptions of error.102  In 2000, Illinois Governor George 
Ryan imposed a moratorium on the death penalty after a study discovered that 
thirteen residents of the state’s death row were actually innocent.103  A 2001 
study conducted by Columbia University law professor James Liebman    
revealed an error rate of sixty-eight percent in capital cases.104  Six states – 
New York (2007), New Jersey (2007), New Mexico (2009), Illinois (2011), 
Connecticut (2012), and Maryland (2013) – have recently abolished capital 
punishment, with a number of other state legislatures considering abolition   
as well.105  Finally, a series of lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of 
lethal injection as a method for execution led to a one-year temporary morato-
rium on capital punishment in 2007-08 while the Supreme Court considered 
the issue.106  
  
 102. See George Ryan, Address at Northwestern University College of Law: I 
Must Act (Jan. 11, 2003), in AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS TO 
STOP AN EXECUTION 163, 178-79 (2005); Repudiating Death, supra note 85, at 442-
45 (describing how both Blackmun and Powell renounced the death penalty and in-
vestigating the basis for these reversals); see also Austin Sarat, Recapturing the Spirit 
o f  Furman: The American Bar Association and the New Abolitionist Politics, 61 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 9-12 (1998). 
 103. Henry Weinstein, Md. Governor Calls Halt to Executions, L.A. TIMES, May 
10, 2002, at A16, available at 2002 WLNR 12444368.  Maryland Governor Parris 
Glendening also declared a moratorium on executions in his state on May 9, 2002.  Id. 
 104. Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of Rever-
sals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 216-
17 (2004).  See Death Penalty Due Process Review Project: Death Penalty Assess-
ments, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/individual_ 
rights/projects/death_penalty_due_process_review_project.html (last visited Oct. 28, 
2013) (formerly known as the “Moratorium Implementation Project,” describing the 
ABA’s moratorium project and providing links to its studies of various states). 
 105. States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Oct. 
28, 2013).  These discussions are continuing, particularly in light of the higher costs 
of capital punishment during an era of economic recession.  See also Ian Urbina, In 
Push to End Death Penalty, Some States Cite Cost-Cutting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 
2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 3623046 (reporting that legislators in Colora-
do, Kansas, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Montana have introduced bills to abolish 
capital punishment in light of higher costs). 
 106. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., Lethal Injection: Stays Granted, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/lethal-injection-stays-granted. The Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of lethal injection in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008), 
but the method of execution still remains a contentious issue in many states.  See, e.g., 
Paul Elias, Calif Execution Collapses After Court Setbacks, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 
30, 2010 (describing ongoing litigation over lethal injection in California); Douglas 
A. Berman, Details on the Botched Ohio Execution Attempt, Issue Spotting, and Seek-
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Another part of the explanation may be that the harshness of the pun-
ishments themselves opened the door for the Court to broaden the Eighth 
Amendment.  Indeed, the Court has highlighted – on more than one occasion 
– the extreme nature of the punishments in comparison to those utilized in the 
rest of the world.107  The first case to highlight this harshness, Atkins, held 
that death sentences for mentally retarded offenders constituted cruel and 
unusual punishments.108  Three years later, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court 
similarly barred death sentences for juvenile offenders.109  And in 2008, the 
Court held in Kennedy v. Louisiana that the death penalty was impermissible 
for non-homicide crimes, striking down a Louisiana statute that made child 
rape a capital crime.110 
All three of these cases followed the Court’s evolving standards of de-
cency test described above, finding that the objective evidence showed that a 
majority of states did not allow the practice in question and, as a subjective 
matter, that the purposes of punishment did not justify its imposition.  Even 
though these decisions departed significantly from the Court’s prior passivity 
in Eighth Amendment cases, the cases were more noteworthy for their signal-
ing value – that is, that death penalty abolition may again be a possibility – 
than for their on-the-ground consequences.111  Indeed, the number of mentally 
retarded offenders, juvenile offenders, and child sex offenders sentenced to 
death was relatively minor.112   
In 2010, the Court broke with its prior focus on capital cases, as ex-
plained below, to examine the Eighth Amendment’s applicability to juvenile 
LWOP sentences.113  In Graham v. Florida, the Court banned juvenile LWOP 
in non-homicide cases, providing a juvenile LWOP analog to the Court’s 
decision in Kennedy.114  Following its evolving standards of decency juris-
  
botched-ohio-executions-issues-spotting-and-seeking-predictions.html (discussing Ohio’s 
struggles with lethal injection in various cases). 
 107. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304 (2002).  
 108. 536 U.S. at 321. 
 109. 543 U.S. at 578-79. 
 110. 554 U.S. 407, 446-47 (2008). 
 111. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 99, at 222. 
 112. Juvenile Offenders Who Were on Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/juvenile-offenders-who-were-death-row (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2013) (juvenile offenders); see Death Penalty for Offenses Other than Mur-
der, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-
offenses-other-murder (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) (child sex offenders); List of De-
fendats with Mental Retardation Executed in the United States, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/list-defendants-mental-retardation-exe-
cuted-united-states (last visited Oct. 28, 2013) (mentally retarded offenders). 
 113. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2017-18 (2010). 
 114. Id. at 2034. 
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prudence, the Court emphasized its understanding from Roper that juveniles 
are, as a class, less culpable than adults.115  
Most recently, the Court extended its absolute proportionality jurispru-
dence to mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences.116  In Miller, the Court held 
that the Eighth Amendment banned mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences, 
providing a juvenile LWOP analog to Woodson.117  As Woodson found with 
regard to the death penalty, the Court in Miller found that the Eighth 
Amendment requires individualized sentencing determinations in juvenile 
LWOP cases.118   
3.  The Importance of “Differentness” 
Given the Court’s hesitancy to infringe on the power of states to im- 
pose punishments under the Eighth Amendment, it has often invoked          
the concept of “differentness” as a justification for its few interventions.119  
The idea is that an extenuating circumstance makes the situation different 
such that (1) it justifies the Court’s incursion into the states’ power to       
punish,120 and (2) it communicates a bright-line limit to allay fear of perva-
sive future incursions.121  
Just as the Court couples its subjective determination of what punish-
ments are excessive with objective indicia that support its instinct, the Court 
employs the concept of differentness in Eighth Amendment cases to achieve a 
sense of legitimacy.122  Because certain cases are unique in their consequenc-
es, the Court believes that it is entitled to regulate the imposition of punish-
ment in those cases.123  Without this hook of differentness, the Court has – for 
the most part – been unwilling to transcend the authority of states to impose 
particular punishments.124 
  
 115. Id. at 2028. 
 116. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463-64 (2012). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 2475. 
 119. See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 616-17 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that because “death is not reversible,” DNA evidence that the convictions 
of numerous persons on death row were erroneous is especially alarming); Spaziano 
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 n.7 (1984) (“[T]he death sentence is unique in its severi-
ty and in its irrevocability.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (“There is 
no question that death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability.”); 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (remarking that death differs 
from life imprisonment because of its “finality”). 
 120. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002); see Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 568-70 (2005). 
 121. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.  
 122. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. 
 123. Id. at 568-69.   
 124. See cases cited supra note 86. 
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As explained in the next section, the first and longstanding conception 
of differentness was that of death: the death penalty is a “different” punish-
ment.125  Graham and Miller have offered a second category of different: 
juvenile offenders.126 
III.  TWO KINDS OF DIFFERENT 
A.  Death Is Different 
As Professor Rachel Barkow and others have argued, the Supreme 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been a tale of two kinds          
of cases: capital and non-capital.127  First coined by Justice William Brennan 
in Furman, the Court has often emphasized, “Death is different.”128          
Specifically, the death penalty is a unique punishment in two senses: its se-
verity and its finality.129 
While some have argued that LWOP is a harsher sentence, the Court has 
recognized on many occasions that the death penalty is the most severe pun-
ishment available.130  Indeed, it is the ultimate punishment as it results in the 
termination of one’s life.131  Consequently, the death penalty is a unique pun-
ishment in that the outcome of its imposition is different from, and more  
severe than, any other punishment.132  Similarly, the death penalty is a unique 
punishment because of its finality.133  Once an offender is dead, there is       
no remedy for him in cases of procedural error or innocence.134  With other 
punishments, due process violations and wrongful convictions – although 
costly – always have the remedy of release from custody.135  In capital cases, 
there are no remedies once punishment occurs; the offender is dead.136 
Referring often to this concept that death-is-different, the Court has jus-
tified its imposition of both the relative and the absolute proportionality re-
quirements under the Eighth Amendment.137  Because the consequence is 
  
 125. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.  
 126. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011 (2010); William W. Berry III, The Mandate of Miller 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter The Mandate of Miller]. 
 127. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 84, at 1146 (acknowledging the Court’s differ-
ent treatment of capital cases); Berman, supra note 84, at 866. 
 128. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
 129. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.   
 130. See cases cited supra note 119.  
 131. See cases cited supra note 119.  
 132. See cases cited supra note 119.  
 133. See cases cited supra note 119. 
 134. See cases cited supra note 119. 
 135. See cases cited supra note 119. 
 136. See cases cited supra note 119. 
 137. See cases cited supra note 119. 
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death, disparity in sentencing outcomes rises to the level of an Eighth 
Amendment problem.138  Similarly, imposition of capital punishment for cer-
tain crimes or certain offenders becomes excessive or inappropriate.139 
In the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases, the concept of death-is-
different not only supported the creation of constitutional prohibitions in capi-
tal cases, it also allowed the Court to eschew any similar analysis in non-
capital cases because they were not “different.”140  Because non-capital of-
fenders did not face the death penalty, their punishments did not merit height-
ened Eighth Amendment scrutiny, even when the punishments were harsh or 
excessive compared to the criminal offense.141 
B.  Juveniles Are Different 
For almost forty years, the death-is-different distinction divided the cas-
es under the Eighth Amendment into two groups.142  In Graham, however, 
the Court contravened this previously impermeable barrier by holding that the 
Eighth Amendment proscribed juvenile LWOP sentences in non-homicide 
cases.143 
In his dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas decried the decision, bemoan-
ing, “Death is different no longer.”144  For the conservative wing of the Court, 
this decision was particularly insulting because it violated the promise of 
differentness, that the Court’s ability to make Eighth Amendment incursions 
into the realm of state legislative authority no longer had a bright-line limita-
tion.145  Chief Justice John Roberts’ concurring opinion, which suggested that 
the Court use a case-by-case analysis in such cases, rather than create a cate-
gorical Eighth Amendment rule, echoed this sentiment.146  For Chief Justice 
Roberts, the facts of Graham itself may have warranted the Court’s interven-
tion, but were certainly not an invitation for the Court to create categorical 
Eighth Amendment proscriptions in non-capital cases.147 
  
 138. See cases cited supra note 119. 
 139. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 
S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).  
 140. See cases cited supra note 86. 
 141. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.  
 143. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
 144. Id. at 2046 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks      
omitted). 
 145. Id. at 2046-47.  The dissenters in Graham made a similarly complaint in 
Miller v. Alabama.  132 S. Ct. 2455, 2481 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 146. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2037 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 147. Id. 
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While the Court clearly believed it ought to extend the Eighth Amend-
ment, it is unclear as to what motivated the Court to cross the death-             
is-different line in Graham.  The Court’s language indicated that LWOP was, 
in many ways, its own kind of death sentence, and thus was not so different 
from death.148  On the other hand, the Court also found that, as individuals 
with inherently decreased culpability, juvenile offenders were unique in   
their own sense.149  Finally, perhaps, it was the combination of these two 
ideas – the severity of LWOP, particularly as imposed upon juveniles, and  
the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders – in the juvenile LWOP    
sentence that justified the Court’s incursion into state legislative power in a 
non-capital case. 
With the Miller v. Alabama decision two years later, however, it has be-
come clearer that the Court recognizes a new kind of “different”: juvenile 
offenders.  In finding that the Eighth Amendment bars mandatory juvenile 
LWOP sentences, Justice Elena Kagan explained that if “‘death is different,’ 
children are different, too.”150 
Though the Court has now clearly articulated its view that juveniles are 
different, it has not yet outlined the contours of this new proclamation of dif-
ferentness.  In other words, if juveniles are different, what further incursions 
into state legislative power might the Court authorize?  As explored below, 
this Article argues that there are two distinct meanings of this conceptualiza-
tion: (1) that juveniles are unique as offenders, and (2) that juvenile LWOP is 
a unique punishment.  While certainly not mutually exclusive, each interpre-
tation offers its own set of consequences and paths to pursue in challenging 
criminal sentences under the Eighth Amendment.  
As indicated above, while the Miller case certainly does not explore 
these possibilities and the Court is not suddenly entertaining a rapid expan-
sion of the Eighth Amendment, the point of illuminating these various rabbit 
holes is to suggest the logical extensions of the Court’s reasoning and the 
bevy of arguments that it has unearthed. 
IV.  EXPLORING HOW JUVENILES ARE DIFFERENT 
A.  Juveniles Are a Unique Character of Offenders 
In Miller, Graham, and Roper, the Court endeavored to demonstrate  
that juveniles are different from adult offenders.151  The Court in Miller iden-
tified the three normatively significant distinctions between the two groups: 
“immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequenc-
  
 148. Id. at 2027; More Different Than Life, supra note 7, at 1124-25. 
 149. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027. 
 150. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012). 
 151. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467-68, 2470; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27; 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-71 (2005). 
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es.”152  The Court described these “three significant gaps between juveniles 
and adults” as follows: 
 
First, children have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility,” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, 
and heedless risk-taking.  Second, children “are more vulnera-
ble . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,” including 
from their family and peers; they have limited “contro[l] over 
their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate them-
selves from horrific, crime-producing settings.  And third, a 
child’s character is not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his traits 
are “less fixed” and his actions less likely to be “evidence of ir-
retrievabl[e] deprav[ity].”153 
 
One sentiment, then, from these decisions is that the unique character of 
juveniles as a class warrants separate consideration for Eighth Amendment 
purposes.  Just as the death penalty has its own set of Eighth Amendment 
rules, so might juveniles have their own protections.  If juveniles are indeed 
different because they are a unique category of offender, they are a different 
kind of “different.”  Instead of the differentness relating to the unique nature 
of a punishment, the juvenile differentness in this conceptualization relates to 
the unique nature of the class of offenders.  Put differently, death is a differ-
ent type of punishment; juveniles are a different type of offender. 
While this distinction might appear to be one of semantics at first 
glance, it actually has important consequences when considering possible 
future applications of the Eighth Amendment.  Considering the character of 
the offender rather than the character of the punishment means that, for      
that class of offender, the Court need not circumscribe its review of punish-
ments inflicted on the class of offenders to the death penalty.  Graham and 
Miller have demonstrated as much, as the Court has applied the Eighth 
Amendment, with reference to this different class of offenders, to a non-
capital sentence: LWOP. 
Thus, if the basis for Eighth Amendment scrutiny is the class of offend-
er, not the type of punishment, then any type of punishment that is excessive 
for a particular class is, in theory, fair game.  In other words, if “juveniles   
are different” creates a class-of-offender-based differentness, then the Eighth 
Amendment would prohibit any sentence that is excessive in light of the  
special characteristics of the class.  This conceptualization also opens          
the door to a second possibility: that there may be other classes of offenders 
that are also different.  If the Eighth Amendment permits categorical proscrip-
tions based on the different nature of the class of offender, as opposed to     
the different nature of the punishment itself, then other classes of offenders 
  
 152. 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 
 153. Id. at 2464 (citations omitted) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, 570). 
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that can demonstrate unique characteristics may warrant their own sets of 
categorical proscriptions. 
B.  Juvenile LWOP is a Unique Category of Punishment 
A second, alternative reading of the Court’s proclamation that juveniles 
are different is in conjunction with the punishment it invalidated in both Gra-
ham and Miller: LWOP.  Rather than viewing the class of the offender as the 
basis for the differentness, this conceptualization contemplates that juvenile 
LWOP sentences are their own unique category of punishment. 
As with the conceptualization of juveniles as a different class of offend-
er, the understanding that juvenile LWOP is a different kind of punishment 
has much support in the language of Graham and Miller.  As the Court ex-
plained, “Life-without-parole terms . . . ‘share some characteristics with death 
sentences that are shared by no other sentences.’”154  Like the death penalty, 
an LWOP sentence is “a forfeiture that is irrevocable.”155  Thus, “[i]n part 
because we viewed this ultimate penalty for juveniles as akin to the death 
penalty,” as the Court explained in Miller, “we treated it similarly to that 
most severe punishment.”156 
If juvenile differentness really refers to the differentness of juvenile 
LWOP, then a different set of possible Eighth Amendment expansions arises.  
First, juvenile LWOP is different in the same way that death is different.  The 
idea is that, for juveniles, juvenile LWOP is essentially a death sentence and, 
as a result, such sentences should receive the same Eighth Amendment pro-
tections as the death penalty. 
Both Graham and Miller support this conceptualization.  One way to 
read Graham is to regard it as the simple application of the death-is-different 
protection from Kennedy to juvenile LWOP.157  If juvenile LWOP is another 
type of death sentence, this application is far less of an intellectual leap than 
the dissenters have suggested.  Put differently, the Court simply reinforced its 
holding that offenders who commit non-homicide offenses cannot receive a 
death sentence by applying it to another type of death sentence – juvenile 
LWOP.  Under the same reading, Miller simply adopted the holding in Wood-
son, which prohibits mandatory death sentences and requires individualized 
consideration of offenders in capital cases.158  In other words, because the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory death sentences and mandatory ju-
venile LWOP is a type of mandatory death sentence, mandatory juvenile 
LWOP violates the Eighth Amendment. 
  
 154. Id. at 2466 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027). 
 155. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027. 
 156. 132 S. Ct. at 2466. 
 157. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 158. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976). 
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Thus, the first significant consequence of reading juvenile LWOP as a 
different type of punishment – in the same way that the death penalty is – is 
to open the door to the application of death-is-different categorical exclusions 
and heightened scrutiny to some, if not all, juvenile LWOP cases.  If the ba-
sis, though, for this expansion is the idea that juvenile LWOP is a second type 
of death sentence, it raises a question as to whether other types of death sen-
tences might also exist.  Under an expanded conception of death, then, other 
sentences equivalent to death in the same way as juvenile LWOP might also 
have the same claim to Eighth Amendment proscriptions. 
A broader conception of what counts as a death sentence for the purpos-
es of the Eighth Amendment might contravene some of the Court’s pre-
Graham decisions such as Harmelin v. Michigan.159  Graham and Miller sug-
gest, however, that such a reading is not far-fetched.  Because Harmelin rest-
ed on “the qualitative difference between death and all other penalties,” Gra-
ham and Miller undermine its precedential value.160  The Court’s holdings in 
Graham and Miller clearly establish that juvenile LWOP is not qualitatively 
different from death for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.161  The Miller 
Court rejected the dissent’s argument that Harmelin foreclosed a broader 
reading of the Eighth Amendment, finding its reading “myopic.”162 
Indeed, the two categorical prohibitions against juvenile LWOP – man-
datory sentences and non-homicide cases – rest upon the idea that this sen-
tence is ultimately a decision that the offender is irredeemable, and thus dead 
to society.  The hopelessness of such a sentence, which condemns the offend-
er to die in prison, makes it similar in character to capital punishment.  At its 
heart, juvenile LWOP is essentially a death sentence.  To require Eighth 
Amendment protections in such cases seems more fair than problematic. 
V.  APPLICATIONS OF CHARACTER-BASED JUVENILE DIFFERENTNESS 
Having explained the intellectual basis for expanding the Eighth 
Amendment through the lenses of character-based and punishment-based 
differentness, in its final two sections this Article concludes by broadly ex-
ploring potential applications of these two theoretical frames.  As explained 
above, if juveniles are different in the sense that they are a unique class of 
offender, two potential consequences logically follow.  First, the limitation on 
death sentences as the only relevant punishment for Eighth Amendment pur-
poses dissipates.  Second, if juveniles are different as a class, other classes of 
offenders may also be different.   
  
 159. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991). 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027-28 (2010); Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 
2463-64. 
 162. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470. 
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A.  Proportionality-Based Juvenile Sentencing 
If the restriction on punishment scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment 
no longer applies, then the doctrinal expansion of the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clause with respect to juveniles could go much further than juvenile 
LWOP cases.  In fact, if the reason for the heightened scrutiny were the na-
ture of juvenile offenders, then any potential punishment would be available 
for the same inquiry.  
Under the principles of Miller, Graham, and Roper, the Court has con-
cluded that juvenile offenders, by definition, possess less culpability than 
adult offenders do, and therefore warrant lesser sentences for the same 
crimes.163  As a result, the Court has theoretically opened the door to the 
question of whether other punishments are excessive for other juvenile 
crimes.  Without the presence of the death-is-different construct, the Court 
could adopt a sliding scale of proportionality with respect to juvenile offend-
ers, justified by the unique nature of the class and its constitutionally-
identified differentness.  Lengthy sentences for juvenile offenders who com-
mitted non-violent crimes, for instance, might violate the Eighth Amendment 
because of juvenile differentness.  The understanding that juvenile offenders 
warrant certain protections because of their vulnerable characteristics as a 
class would therefore apply to any potential punishment. 
The jurisprudential outcome of this character-based notion of juvenile 
differentness would be a series of decisions in which the Court identifies    
the outer limits of the state’s power to impose certain punishments on       
juveniles as related to particular offenses.  Put differently, this approach 
would allow for a proportionality revolution of sorts, with pure absolute pro-
portionality inquiries applying to all juvenile offenders, irrespective of the 
punishment imposed.164 
The virtue of such a system would be to require the Court to engage in a 
serious review of the punishment practices of state legislatures, at least with 
respect to juvenile offenders.  In such a context, the Court would actively 
regulate the punishment decisions of states by throwing out excessive juve-
nile punishments, and would serve as a check on the tyranny of the majority.  
Such a system might help to counterbalance the reactionary nature of penal 
populism that has led to the United States being an outlier in the world in 
terms of criminal justice policy.  Moreover, such an approach would not be 
unique for the Court, particularly in comparison to its incursions into state 
power in other areas of the Constitution.  In particular, the Fourth Amend-
ment’s robust jurisprudence provides an example of the Supreme Court en-
  
 163. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028-30; Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005). 
 164. See Nancy Gertner, Keynote Address at the Missouri Law Review Sym-
posium: Miller and the Eighth Amendment: Major Change or Sui Generis? (March   
8, 2013).  
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gaging in a similar type of case-by-case analysis to determine the contours of 
an open-ended constitutional provision.165 
B.  Other Kinds of “Different” 
If, as mentioned above, juveniles are a unique class of offenders, other 
possible classes of offenders might deserve similar Eighth Amendment pro-
tection.  This subsection considers some possible candidates. 
1.  Mental Retardation 
Perhaps the most obvious candidate for a second protected class of of-
fenders under the Eighth Amendment is the class that started the categorical 
revolution in Atkins: mentally retarded offenders.166  Like juveniles, mentally 
retarded offenders possess a diminished capacity.167  
As the Court explained in Atkins, “[b]ecause of their impairments, how-
ever, [mentally retarded offenders] by definition . . . have diminished capaci-
ties to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from 
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control 
impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.”168  As a result, “[t]heir 
deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do 
diminish their personal culpability.”169  Indeed, mentally retarded offenders 
are similar to juveniles in that both classes possess a diminished culpability 
and, as a result, perhaps deserve less punishment.  
But there are core differences, too, which might make the Court hesitant 
to declare mentally retarded offenders a protected class for Eighth Amend-
ment purposes.  First, there is a decreased likelihood of rehabilitation for 
mentally retarded individuals, as members of that class (as the Court defines 
it) often possess sub-average intelligence and reduced adaptive skills.170  In 
both Graham and Miller, the possibility for growth and redemption clearly 
influenced the Court’s willingness to restrict juvenile LWOP sentences.171  
This is not always the case for mentally retarded offenders.172   
  
 165. See, e.g., THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND 
INTERPRETATION 15, 47 (2008). 
 166. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“Mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate 
face a special risk of wrongful execution.”). 
 167. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463. 
 168. 536 U.S. at 318. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. at 208 n.3, 320. 
 171. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 
2026 (2010)) (“Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects 
for reform, we explained, ‘they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.’”); 
J. M. Kirby, Graham, Miller, & the Right to Hope, 15 CUNY L. REV. 149, 152 (2011) 
(“The [Miller] decision recognizes rehabilitation as ‘a penological goal that forms the 
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Second, while the age of the offender is usually an ascertainable fact,  
the question of whether an offender qualifies as mentally retarded for judicial 
purposes is often unclear.173  The result in many cases will be litigation     
over the question of mental retardation, requiring significant court time      
and resources.174 
Finally, at the heart of the Court’s willingness to prohibit the death pen-
alty in Atkins was the inability of mentally retarded offenders to communi-
cate.175  This difficulty in communication manifests itself in the ability of the 
state to convey its reasons for the death penalty to the offender.176  It also 
creates problems in the offender’s ability to discuss and establish an adequate 
defense with his attorney.177  As such, the broadening of the Eighth Amend-
ment to restrict LWOP sentences for mentally retarded offenders seems more 
complicated than applying it to juvenile LWOP sentences.   
Nonetheless, the Eighth Amendment could apply to mentally retarded 
offenders under this conceptualization by regulating the type of offense, ra-
ther than just the severity.  The Court could theoretically proscribe certain 
types of sentences for mentally retarded offenders to ensure that such offend-
ers receive sentences that both comport with their offenses and consider their 
diminished capacity. 
2.  Mental Illness 
A second potential class of offenders protected under this character-
based model of juvenile differentness would be mentally ill offenders.  While 
mentally retarded offenders simply lack capacity, mentally ill offenders can 
possess a host of other mental illnesses that influence their ability to perceive 
the world around them.178  
  
basis of parole systems’ in determining that penological theories do not justify non-
homicide juvenile LWOP sentences. In support of its holding, the court in Miller 
reiterates Graham's reasoning regarding the role of the rehabilitation.”).  
 172. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.  
 173. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. 
 174. See, e.g., id., remanded to 266 Va. 73 (2003) (to decide the issue of whether 
or not the defendant was mentally retarded). 
 175. Id. at 318 (“Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference be-
tween right and wrong and are competent to stand trial, but, by definition, they have 
diminished capacities . . . to communicate . . . .  Their deficiencies do not warrant an 
exemption from criminal sanctions, but diminish their personal culpability.”). 
 176. See, e.g., id. at 320; Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, THE NEW YORKER, 
Feb. 22, 1993, at 105 (describing the execution of Rickey Ray Rector, who saved his 
dessert at his final meal for later). 
 177. See Atkins, 563 U.S. at 320-21. 
 178. Alice Medalia & Nadine Revheim, Dealing with Cognitive Dysfunction As-
sociated with psychiatric disabilities: A handbook for families and friends of individ-
uals with psychiatric disorders, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
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As a class, then, mentally ill offenders might warrant specialized   
Eighth Amendment consideration with respect to certain punishments.          
In particular, the Court could weigh the effectiveness of incarceration against 
the effectiveness of institutionalization.  In doing so, the Court could develop 
bright-line rules circumscribing the ability of the state to punish the mentally 
ill in certain ways.  Further, by creating categorical prohibitions or other re-
strictions, the Court might ensure that states do not abdicate their responsibil-
ity to treat mentally ill offenders humanely, whether guilty of petty crimes or 
capital ones. 
An added benefit of heightened Eighth Amendment scrutiny with re-
spect to mentally ill offenders is that states might decrease recidivism rates 
and better incapacitate individuals who are truly dangerous because of a men-
tal condition.179  Because they possess unique characteristics, mentally ill 
offenders may merit the same Eighth Amendment protections that capital 
offenders receive.  
Even so, expanding the Eighth Amendment in this way would create its 
own set of difficulties.  The most significant of these difficulties would be 
delineating the class of offenders in determining which mental illnesses quali-
fy.  Further, the wide range of diseases and conditions falling under the rubric 
of mental illness could encompass such a diverse group of individuals as to 
make a bright-line constitutional rule impractical.  
3.  Veterans 
Another possible category of offenders warranting heightened Eighth 
Amendment protection is individuals who have served in the armed forces.  
Like juveniles and mentally-compromised offenders, veterans possess charac-
teristics that suggest that they might be less culpable than other offenders. 
First, the act of serving in the military should count as a mitigating    
factor in most criminal cases.180  Thus, all things being equal, military service 
could mean that a particular offender merits a lesser sentence.181  Unlike   
mentally retarded offenders, mentally ill offenders, or juveniles, veterans may 
deserve their own class for Eighth Amendment purposes based on their    
merit – rather than diminished capacity.  Second, military service in which 
the veteran suffered a serious injury might also provide a mitigating factor in 
terms of diminished capacity.182  Such injuries may be physical, mental, or 
  
http://www.omh.ny.gov/omhweb/cogdys_manual/CogDysHndbk.htm (last modified 
Nov. 15, 2012).  
 179. Psychotic and schizophrenic individuals, in particular, come to mind. 
 180. See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40, 43-44 (2009). 
 181. See Anthony E. Giardino, Combat Veterans, Mental Health Issues, and the 
Death Penalty: Addressing the Impact of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Trau-
matic Brain Injury, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2955, 2965-68 (2009). 
 182. See id. at 2965-66.  Individuals with toxic shock syndrome or other similar 
conditions might merit mitigating consideration. 
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emotional, but given that they occurred during the course of service to one’s 
country, courts may be willing to consider the degree to which such circum-
stances lessen the appropriate sentence. 
Categorical rules, then, might be appropriate for veterans as a class.  For 
instance, LWOP sentences might be excessive for all veterans because it is 
cruel and unusual to declare a veteran to be an irredeemable person.183  On 
the other hand, isolating veterans as a class for Eighth Amendment purposes 
has its own difficulties as well.  The concept of using a “moral ledger” de-
parts significantly from the idea of vulnerable offenders, and opens the door 
to a number of other possible groups that might have similar merit.  This dif-
ference suggests that it may be more appropriate to allow juries to consider 
such evidence on an individual basis rather than to create a bright-line consti-
tutional rule.   
4.  Other Possible Categories 
Aside from the three possible groups above, it is difficult to identify 
other classes that should be different for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.  
Categories relating to gender or race – while important in the discrimination 
context – seem to have little bearing here, although it is possible that a conse-
quence of demonstrating systemic discrimination would be to create Eighth 
Amendment protections for the affected group.184 
At the other end of the spectrum, age seems to be a possibility, though 
an unlikely one.185  The theory would be that elderly individuals suffer from 
some kind of diminished capacity warranting Eighth Amendment exclu-
sions.186  Another possible way to explore Eighth Amendment exclusions for 
the elderly would be to assess the impact of term sentences as they relate to 
age.  For instance, giving a ten-year sentence to a seventy-year-old individual 
for a non-violent crime might create Eighth Amendment issues because its 
effect may be the same as an LWOP sentence.187  It might be, however, 
equally insulting to equate elderly offenders with juvenile offenders, particu-
larly because old age and diminished capacity are often not related.  Further, 
in many ways the loss of capacity in elderly offenders seems different than 
the underdeveloped character of juveniles. 
  
 183. It is worth remembering that for dangerous offenders, the state can always 
keep them in prison even with the abolition of LWOP.  18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) (2012).  
Such a decision just means that the state must revisit the sentence later.  Id. at § 
4247(e)-(f). 
 184. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315-19 (1987). 
 185. Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 
1136 (2006). 
 186. See id. at 952-53. 
 187. A more palatable way to think of this is to consider it in the context of death-
in-custody sentences. See infra Part VI.B. 
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As mentioned above, there is the opportunity to develop a sliding scale 
of proportionality with respect to all of the categories identified here.  The 
Court could define proportionality with respect to a particular punishment for 
a particular class.  Alternatively, the Court could create categorical exceptions 
for certain punishments for certain crimes where the offender falls into one of 
the protected categories. 
VI.  APPLICATIONS OF PUNISHMENT-BASED JUVENILE 
DIFFERENTNESS 
Examining the other conceptualization of “juveniles are different” – that 
is, viewing juvenile LWOP as another kind of different punishment – yields 
an entirely different set of practical applications.  As explained above, if ju-
venile LWOP is different, it is because it is essentially a type of death sen-
tence.  With that in mind, it is worth considering the degree to which juvenile 
LWOP should be a corollary to the current death-is-different Eighth Amend-
ment proscriptions. 
A.  Juvenile LWOP Is Different Like Death Is Different 
1.  Categorical Exclusions 
As with the death penalty, juvenile LWOP creates the possibility of cat-
egorical exclusions based upon its uniqueness as a punishment.  Indeed, as 
explored above, the Court has already established two such exceptions: bar-
ring juvenile LWOP sentences in non-homicide cases in Graham,188 and 
mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences in Miller.189 
The obvious place to look, then, for possible further categorical exclu-
sions for juvenile LWOP is to the Court’s death penalty cases.  It is also 
worth considering that while juvenile LWOP as a punishment may be differ-
ent in the same way that the death penalty is different as a punishment, it 
might nonetheless be a different and less severe punishment such that not 
every analogous categorical prohibition may apply. 
One likely suspect for expansion of death-is-different categorical exclu-
sions is in the area of felony murder cases.  The Court held in Enmund v. 
Florida that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death 
penalty where the offender “aids and abets a felony in the course of which a 
murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, 
or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed.”190  It 
limited this exception, though, in Tison v. Arizona, explaining that the Eighth 
Amendment did not bar the imposition of the death penalty in felony murder 
  
 188. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
 189. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
 190. 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982). 
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cases where the defendant exhibited a “reckless disregard for human life.”191  
Many of the same considerations relating to adult participation in felony 
murder also apply to juvenile participation, including the likelihood of de-
creased culpability.  As a result, adoption of this categorical exclusion for 
juvenile LWOP cases seems palatable. 
Two perhaps more difficult cases would be the categorical exclusions 
that relate to the mental characteristics of the offender.  The prohibition 
against giving the death penalty to a mentally retarded offender might not 
apply as easily to the case of a mentally retarded juvenile offender facing an 
LWOP sentence.  While rehabilitation – and thus the possibility for a produc-
tive life – is one of the central reasons for giving juvenile LWOP heightened 
Eighth Amendment scrutiny,192 mentally retarded juveniles may be less likely 
to demonstrate maturity and personal growth.193  In addition, the importance 
of communicating the reason for the sanction to a mentally retarded offender 
loses force when the death penalty is not involved. 
A second group categorically excluded based on the mental capacity of 
the offender is the Eighth Amendment prohibition against execution of insane 
defendants under Ford v. Wainwright.194  As with mentally retarded juvenile 
offenders, insane juvenile offenders seem less likely to warrant a categorical 
exclusion for juvenile LWOP.195  For the same reasons as indicated above, 
barring a juvenile LWOP sentence on grounds of insanity does not seem to 
advance the Eighth Amendment rationale for a categorical exclusion in the 
same manner. 
The most aggressive categorical prohibition to apply to juvenile LWOP 
would be to use Roper as an analog to declare that juvenile LWOP itself  
violated the Eighth Amendment.196  The Court declined to entertain this issue 
in Miller, but suggested in dicta that it might be a question worth consider-
ing.197  Specifically, the Court highlighted the absence of “deliberate, express, 
and full legislative consideration” of the appropriateness of juvenile LWOP 
sentences.198  The reasoning would be that the death penalty is an excessive 
punishment for juveniles, and as juvenile LWOP is a type of death penalty  
for juveniles, it should receive a categorical Eighth Amendment exclusion.  
The reasoning of the Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller – that juveniles   
  
 191. 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987). 
 192. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.  
 193. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002). 
 194. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986). 
 195. See Christina Lee, The Judicial Response to Psychopathic Criminals: Utili-
tarianism over Retribution, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 125, 129 (2007); Ont. Ministry 
of Children and Youth Servs., Review of the Roots of Youth Violence: Literature Re-
views, http://www.children.gov.on.ca/htdocs/English/topics/youthandthelaw/roots/ 
volume5/chapter02_psychological_theories.aspx (last modified Apr. 27, 2010). 
 196. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 197. See Miller v. Alabama, 123 S. Ct. 2455, 2473 (2012). 
 198. Id. at 2473 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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are different and that LWOP is a type of death sentence – gives support to 
such a reading.199  
Banning juvenile LWOP would not necessarily mean that no juvenile 
offenders would serve a life sentence.  Rather, it would simply mean that 
states, at some future date, would re-examine the question of whether the 
juvenile offender could rejoin society. 
2.  Heightened Procedural Scrutiny 
A second, different consequence of concluding that juvenile LWOP    
(as a punishment) is different in the same way that death is different would  
be the development of heightened procedural protections in juvenile     
LWOP cases.  This expansion could occur both in terms of absolute and rela-
tive proportionality. 
In terms of absolute proportionality, Miller already indicated the need 
for courts to make individualized sentencing determinations in juvenile 
LWOP cases as required by Woodson in capital cases.200  The corollary prin-
ciple from Lockett v. Ohio – that the state cannot restrict the introduction of 
mitigating evidence at capital sentencing – ought similarly to apply in juve-
nile LWOP cases.201  This is particularly true because juvenile offenders are 
often likely to have relevant mitigating evidence to introduce.202  
As to the question of relative proportionality, the same set of death pen-
alty safeguards could theoretically apply to juvenile LWOP.  The Court could 
require states to adopt aggravating circumstances, as well as systemic safe-
guards such as proportionality review.  There is one significant difference, 
though, between the death penalty and juvenile LWOP that makes this unlike-
ly.  Capital cases, unlike juvenile LWOP cases, often require the jury to make 
the sentencing decision, increasing both the likelihood of sentencing disparity 
and the need for safeguards.203 
Nonetheless, some similar safeguards might be appropriate given the 
uneven application of juvenile LWOP sentences by states.  Part of the prob-
lem is that many states, in adopting truth-in-sentencing laws, abolished pa-
role.204  As a result, life sentences become LWOP sentences, even in cases 
  
 199. Id. at 2458 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70); id. at 2459 (citing Graham v. 
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010)). 
 200. Id. at 2475. 
 201. 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). 
 202. Beth Caldwell, Appealing to Empathy: Counsel’s Obligation to Present Mit-
igating Evidence for Juveniles in Adult Court, 64 ME. L. REV. 391, 408-09 (2012). 
 203. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System: Supplementary 
Data, Analysis and Revised Protocols for Capital Case Review, Part IV.B, 
JUSTICE.GOV (June 6, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/dag/pubdoc/deathpenalty 
study.htm.  
 204. Truth in Sentencing Law & Legal Definition, USLegal, http://definitions. 
uslegal.com/t/truth-in-sentencing/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). 
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where the legislature might not have initially sought to mandate death in the 
custody of the state.  Requiring states to create safeguards to ensure that those 
receiving juvenile LWOP sentences are the worst of the juvenile offenders 
would help remedy the seemingly haphazard application of juvenile LWOP 
sentences in which almost half of those serving such sentences committed 
non-violent crimes.205 
B.  Death Includes Other Death-in-Custody Sentences 
The second possible area of Eighth Amendment expansion in the realm 
of punishment-based juvenile differentness is a further broadening of the 
definition of death under the Eighth Amendment.  In other words, if the con-
cept of juveniles-are-different really means that juvenile LWOP is different, it 
raises the question of whether other punishments likewise ought to be differ-
ent for Eighth Amendment purposes.  Specifically, if juvenile LWOP is a 
type of death penalty, it seems that LWOP and other lengthy sentences might 
too be types of death sentences. 
1.  LWOP 
The first candidate for expanding the definition of death beyond juvenile 
LWOP is LWOP itself.  The only fundamental difference between the two 
sentences is, of course, the age of the offender.  Moreover, in many cases this 
difference is negligible.  An eighteen-year-old offender is really no different 
than one who is seventeen, at least in terms of the impact of an LWOP sen-
tence.  Relevant science indicates that cognitive development continues until 
age twenty-five, such that the line of demarcation between juvenile and adult 
does not occur until then.206  As a majority of offenders are under the age of 
twenty-five, the distinction between a juvenile LWOP sentence and an 
LWOP sentence is not of great significance.  
Further, the consequence of an LWOP sentence is the same for both   
the juvenile and adult offender: death in prison.  Neither will ever leave the 
  
 205. See CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 11, at 26, 33-34. 
 206. Cynthia Klein, Maturation of the Prefrontal Cortex, Bridges 2 Understand-
ing (Mar. 5, 2013), http://bridges2understanding.com/maturation-of-the-prefrontal-
cortex/ (“This [prefrontal cortex] region of the brain gives an individual the capacity 
to exercise ‘good judgment’ when presented with difficult life situations. Brain re-
search indicating that brain development is not complete until near the age of 25, 
refers specifically to the development of the prefrontal cortex.”); see Joseph M. 
Peraino & Patrick J. Fitz-Gerald, Psychological Considerations in Direct Filing, 
Colo. Law., May 2011, at 41, 42 (“Adolescent brains experience periods of explosive 
growth and restructuring.  During adolescence, brains that have been developing 
neural connections since before birth undergo a long process of insulating neural 
pathways so they eventually will operate more quickly and efficiently.  Neuroscience 
research shows that human brains do not fully develop until age 25.”). 
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custody of the state.  Indeed, the notion that having a few extra years to    
rehabilitate fundamentally distinguishes these two sentences for constitutional 
purposes ignores the reality of juvenile LWOP and LWOP generally.           
As LWOP and juvenile LWOP are essentially the same sentence, it makes 
sense to expand the conception of death to include LWOP sentences as    
well.  Doing so opens the door to similar categorical exclusions as identified 
for juvenile LWOP, as well as similar heightened scrutiny.  Specifically, 
mandatory LWOP sentences seem particularly problematic and, as such,     
are an area in need of immediate reform.  As I have written elsewhere, the 
Miller case arguably mandates the extension of its juvenile LWOP principle 
to all LWOP sentences.207 
2.  Sentences Approaching Life Expectancy 
Beyond LWOP, sentences in which the offender is likely to die in prison 
also fit the same broad definition of death.  These de facto LWOP sentences 
occur when the length of the sentence approaches the life expectancy of the 
offender.208  The practical consequence, then, of such a sentence is that the 
offender will die in the custody of the state. 
Because there is no functional difference between LWOP sentences and 
de facto LWOP sentences, the Eighth Amendment conception of death under 
this punishment-based reading of juveniles-are-different should include such 
sentences.  Term sentences approaching the life expectancy of the offender 
would then receive at least some of the same protections as capital cases.  The 
opportunity for individualized sentencing consideration, the ability to put on 
mitigating evidence, and a prohibition against mandatory term sentences ex-
tending to the end of an offender’s life expectancy would all be protections 
available under this expansion. 
3.  Long Sentences 
Finally, and perhaps more controversially, long sentences might also 
count as death sentences for Eighth Amendment purposes.  Imagine a juve-
nile offender who receives a fifty-year sentence; it is effectively a death sen-
tence for him, even though he is likely to leave prison one day.  As prison 
will be his home for most of the productive years of his life, the sentence in 
many ways condemns his life to a kind of death.  The inability to have any 
semblance of a life in light of a lengthy incarceration suggests that such a 
sentence is the functional equivalent of death. 
Following this line of analysis, some of the death-is-different protections 
seemingly would apply for such lengthy sentences.  In particular, the ability 
to introduce mitigating evidence, to have a Court determine such a sentence 
  
 207. See The Mandate of Miller, supra note 126.  
 208. See CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 11, at 21.  
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(as opposed to a legislatively-imposed mandatory minimum), and the possi-
bility for rehabilitation (as with juveniles) all seem to be important possible 
safeguards for such offenders. 
  VII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to illuminate many of the potential lines of 
argument flowing from the Court’s decision in Miller.  Rather than advocate 
for one normative approach over another, this Article instead aimed to en-
courage academics and practitioners alike to develop these ideas in hopes that 
the courts will continue to expand the Eighth Amendment and provide a more 
robust review of state punishment practices.  Specifically, this Article sought 
to demonstrate the ambiguity in the Court’s characterization of juveniles as a 
new kind of Eighth Amendment different.  Each approach, then, offers its 
own consequences based upon the theoretical constructs inherent in each.  
If juveniles are a different kind of offender, then Miller and Graham 
open the door to a sliding scale of Eighth Amendment proportionality for 
juvenile offenders.  Further, if juveniles are a unique class under the Eighth 
Amendment, this suggests that other classes – such as mentally retarded of-
fenders, mentally ill offenders, or veterans – might also warrant heightened 
Eighth Amendment scrutiny. 
If juvenile LWOP were a different kind of punishment, then the mean-
ing of death under the Eighth Amendment would now encompass juvenile 
LWOP.  The result would be the exporting of categorical safeguards in capi-
tal cases to juvenile LWOP cases as the Court has done in Miller and Gra-
ham.209  In addition, procedural protections accorded to offenders in capital 
cases might also apply in juvenile LWOP cases.  Perhaps even more im-
portantly, if death includes juvenile LWOP, it reasonably should include 
LWOP sentences – as well as de facto LWOP sentences – and maybe even 
lengthy term sentences. 
Finally, none of these technical doctrinal approaches would be necessary 
if the Supreme Court would apply a simple proportionality test to its applica-
tion of the Eighth Amendment and, in doing so, robustly regulate the use of 
punishment by states.  Until the Court moves in a more sweeping way, in-
cremental change under the Eighth Amendment remains the best hope for the 
Court in recapturing its role as protector of the individual Eighth Amendment 
right to be free from excessive punishment at the hands of the state legisla-
tures and courts. 
 
  
 209. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 
S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
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